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THE END OF THE AMERICAN 




This essay is grounded in two basic propositions. The first is 
that the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran have emerged 
as the leading antagonists in a new Middle Eastern “Cold War” —a 
struggle over American primacy in the Middle East that shapes its 
geopolitics, even as the region is going through dramatic changes on 
multiple levels. The second is that how the U.S.-Iranian competition 
for influence plays out will have profound consequences not just for 
the Middle East, but also for the legal frameworks, rules-based 
regimes, and mechanisms of global governance that shape 
international order in the 21st century. This is especially true with 
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regard to U.S.-Iranian disagreements over the Islamic Republic’s 
nuclear activities. 
Strategic competition between America and Iran and its 
implications for international order play out against a backdrop of the 
progressive diminution of U.S. leadership in world affairs—the end 
of what Andrew Bacevich has called “the short American century.”1 
Since Henry Luce proclaimed the American century’s 
commencement in 1941, and especially since the Cold War’s end, 
America’s status as the preeminent power in the Middle East has 
been crucial to its global standing. At the same time, official 
American self-presentation and a considerable body of commentary 
and scholarship have linked U.S. primacy to the provision of global 
public goods; these include the transactional platforms and political 
and security arrangements needed to sustain economic openness and 
encourage continuing liberalization. The provision of such public 
goods has been bound up with the elaboration of rules-based regimes 
for key dimensions of international security (e.g., the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty) and global commerce. 
For decades, Washington has relied on perceptions of 
America as benevolent hegemon to legitimate first its post-World 
War II dominance over the non-communist world and then its post-
Cold War primacy, in the Middle East and globally. However, U.S. 
administrations have also sought to manage the provision of public 
goods to ensure and maximize American power and influence—often 
in ways that contravene the image of America as benevolent 
hegemon.2 
                                                 
1 Andrew Bacevich, Life at the Dawn of the American Century, in THE SHORT 
AMERICAN CENTURY: A POSTMORTEM 1-14 (Andrew Bacevich ed., 2012).   
2 See, e.g., DANIEL H. JOYNER, INTERPRETING THE NUCLEAR NON-
PROLIFERATION TREATY 6-20 (2011) (discussing how, in its early advocacy for 
what would become the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the United States was 
only concerned with forestalling the proliferation of nuclear weapons to preserve 
its strategic advantages as one of two nuclear superpowers; it was only in response 
to pressure from non-nuclear weapons states that America reluctantly agreed to 
include in the Treaty a commitment by nuclear weapons states to nuclear 
disarmament and recognition of all states’ right to the peaceful use of nuclear 
technology). The relationship of these three core principles in the Treaty and the 
ramifications of this relationship for the Iranian nuclear issue is treated at greater 
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As the United States experiences relative decline, this 
approach becomes less and less sustainable.3 Its perpetuation is also 
                                                 
length below, and in other articles in this issue of the journal by Daniel Joyner, 
Iran’s Nuclear Program and International Law, 2 PENN. ST. J. L. & INT’L AFF. 282 
(2013), and Richard Butler, NPT: A Pillar of Global Governance, 2 PENN. ST. J. L. & 
INT’L AFF. 272. See also ANDREW BACEVICH, AMERICAN EMPIRE: THE REALITIES 
AND CONSEQUENCES OF U.S. DIPLOMACY 1-6, 32-54, 71-116 (2002) (discussing 
how American policymakers calculated that the promotion of economic 
globalization after the Cold War ended would ensure America’s global primacy well 
into the 21st century); Robert Gilpin, The Rise of American Hegemony, in TWO 
HEGEMONIES: BRITAIN 1846-1914 AND THE UNITED STATES 1946-2001, 165-82 
(Patrick Karl O’Brien & Armand Clesse eds., 2002), 
https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/ipe/gilpin.htm (discussing how, in a Cold 
War context, Washington leveraged its hegemonic position in post-World War II 
regimes for international trade and monetary relations to lock Western Europe and 
Japan into security-dependent alliances with the United States); ROBERT GILPIN, 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 90 (1987) (discussing 
how the United States shifted from a more “benevolent” to a more “predatory” 
mode of economic hegemony in the 1960s and 1970s to manage its growing 
current account and fiscal deficits); ERIC HELLIENER, STATES AND THE 
REEMERGENCE OF GLOBAL FINANCE: FROM BRETTON WOODS TO THE 1990S 
(1996) (discussing how the promotion of financial liberalization in the 1960s, 
1970s, and 1980s allowed the United States to leverage its unique structural 
advantages in international finance to ensure its continued leadership in 
international economic affairs even as its position in global manufacturing eroded); 
Flynt Leverett & Hillary Mann Leverett, The Balance of Power, Public Goods, and the 
Lost Art of Grand Strategy: American Policy toward the Persian Gulf and Rising Asia in the 
21st Century, 1 PENN. ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 202, 210-11 (2012), 
http://elibrary.law.psu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1010&context=jlia 
(discussing how America’s commitment to secure the flow of Persian Gulf oil and 
gas to international markets has never had that much to do with America’s own 
energy demand, being motivated to a much greater extent by Washington’s interest 
in reinforcing its strategic influence in other important parts of the world where 
Persian Gulf hydrocarbons fill critical parts of the energy mix). Since September 11, 
2001, the compatibility of aspects of America’s “war on terror” with international 
law has been roundly challenged; likewise, the 2003 invasion and subsequent 
occupation of Iraq—justified by Washington as essential to Middle East and global 
security—is seen by most of the international community as illegal.  The 
application of use of force doctrine to the Iranian nuclear case is also treated at 
greater length below, and in other articles in this issue of the journal by Mary Ellen 
O’Connell & Reyam El Molla, The Prohibition on the Use of Force for Arms Control: The 
Case of Iran’s Nuclear Program, 2 PENN. ST. J. L. & INT’L AFF. 315 (2013) and James 
Houck, Caroline Revisited: An Imagined Exchange Between John Kerry and Mohammad Javad 
Zarif, 2 PENN. ST. J. L. & INT’L AFF. 293 (2013). 
3 See Michael Mastanduno, System Maker and Privilege Taker: U.S. Power and 
the International Political Economy, 61 WORLD POL. 121 (2009), for more on this point.   
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prospectively dangerous for U.S. interests. Because the structure of 
contemporary international relations is shaped by social as well as 
material factors, the perceived legitimacy of a great power’s actions 
matter greatly.4 As new powers rise, they can leverage Washington’s 
hegemonic abuses to marshal resistance to America’s strategic 
ambitions and delegitimize its primacy, thereby weakening its 
international position.5 
Today, the U.S. posture toward the Islamic Republic is the 
most potent driver of hegemonic unilateralism in American foreign 
policy. Washington’s determination to preserve its ambitions for 
dominance in the Middle East puts it on a collision course with the 
Islamic Republic, with its strong commitment to foreign policy 
independence. With a coterie of European hangers-on, the United 
States is focused on forcing the Islamic Republic to abandon its 
nuclear program, accept open-ended U.S. and Israeli military 
dominance in the Middle East, and acquiesce in its (Western-
sponsored) transformation into a secular liberal state. On a regional 
level, this makes negotiating plausible solutions with Tehran, on the 
nuclear issue and other challenges, virtually impossible. It also puts 
America’s Iran policy at odds with material and social reality in the 
                                                 
4 See Leverett & Mann Leverett, supra note 2, at 220-21, for a discussion 
of the importance of legitimacy for American primacy in the Middle East. 
5 This is an underappreciated but increasingly salient aspect of what 
Robert Pape generically describes as “soft balancing”—the use of “nonmilitary 
tools” to “delay, complicate, or increase the costs” of a unipolar leader’s hegemonic 
assertions that threaten other states’ interests. In Pape’s presentation, leveraging 
“the rules and procedures of important international organizations” and advancing 
“strict interpretations of neutrality”—and, I would add, of other aspects of 
international law—figure among the nonmilitary tools that can be deployed to 
constrain a unipole’s initiatives. See Robert Pape, Soft Balancing Against the United 
States, 30 INT’L SEC. 7, 17, 36 (2005), 
 http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/1019-is-30-1_final_02-pape.pdf. See also 
Martha Finnemore, Legitimacy, Hypocrisy, and the Social Structure of Unipolarity: Why 
Being a Unipole Isn’t All It’s Cracked Up to Be, 61 WORLD POL. 58 (2009), 
http://www.polisci.wisc.edu/Uploads/Documents/IRC/Finnemore%20(2009).pd
f (discussing how institutions, laws, and rules—even those originally championed 
by a unipolar power—have internal logics of their own that are hard for unipoles to 
control, and how “unrestrained hypocrisy” by a unipole undermines the legitimacy 
of its primacy); Shirley Scott, International Law As Ideology: Theorizing the Relationship 
between International Law and International Politics, 5 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1 (1994), 
http://207.57.19.226/journal/Vol5/No3/art1.pdf.   
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Middle East, contributing to the accelerating erosion of U.S. standing 
in one of the world’s most vital areas. 
On a global level, determination to compel Iran’s surrender 
prompts ever more assiduous efforts by America and its partners to 
coerce other states into pressing Tehran. In the process, the United 
States violates basic principles of rules-based regimes for nuclear 
nonproliferation, trade, and other vital issues. Similarly, the lurking 
threat that Washington will launch yet another Middle Eastern war to 
cut Iran down to size—reflected in U.S. officials’ regular reminders 
that “all options are on the table” —breaks international law 
regarding the use of force. This, too, is detached from strategic 
reality—as the Obama administration’s self-inflicted debacle over its 
declared intention to use military force against the Syrian government 
following the use of chemical weapons in Syria on August 21, 2013 
vividly demonstrated. The United Nations Security Council was not 
about to authorize such a venture—and, in the end, neither the Arab 
League, NATO, the British parliament, nor even the U.S. Congress 
was prepared to endorse it. This episode suggests that, as America’s 
relative decline proceeds, the credibility of its threats to use force for 
blatantly hegemonic purposes is eroding as well—which means that 
continued resort to such threats is not just illegal, but self-damaging 
in strategic terms. 
Relative decline challenges the United States to share the 
prerogatives of global governance, especially with rising powers in 
the global South. Such collaboration would enhance prospects for 
more effective global governance by aligning responsibility and 
capacity more accurately; it would also help sustain America’s 
influence, even as its relative power declines. By contrast, abusively 
hegemonic assertions will provoke intensifying backlash from non-
Western powers that will damage America’s long-term position in 
international affairs. That is why the manner in which the U.S.-
Iranian competition for influence in the Middle East plays out over 
the next few years—and how the United States conducts itself in this 
competition—will decisively affect both America’s international 
standing and the dynamics of international order in the 21st century. 
This essay, organized in four sections, looks at the 
prospective impact of U.S.-Iranian tensions over Iran’s nuclear 
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activities on global governance. The first section examines the Iranian 
challenge to America’s hegemonic ambitions in the Middle East and, 
more particularly, how the Iranian nuclear program fits into Tehran’s 
counter-hegemonic strategy. The second section lays out how U.S.-
Iranian differences over the Islamic Republic’s nuclear activities 
reflect two very different conceptions of international order. The 
third and fourth sections then consider how these different 
conceptions of world order lead Washington, Tehran, and their 
respective supporters to different positions on what the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty means for the Iranian case, and on what 
international law says about the prospective use of force against 
Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. 
I.  IRAN, THE UNITED STATES, AND THE MIDDLE EAST’S  
SHIFTING BALANCE OF POWER 
Since World War II, and especially since the end of the Cold 
War, the United States’ status as the Middle East’s preeminent power 
has been, as noted, crucial to its global primacy. America’s unique 
capability to project conventional military power into the Middle East 
has enabled it to assume responsibility for the physical security of 
hydrocarbon flows from the Persian Gulf, on which the global 
economy depends, and to become the presumptive enforcer of order 
in the region. This muscle has given the United States extraordinary 
economic and political influence in the Middle East, which in turn 
has reinforced American dominance in other important parts of the 
world. 
Today, the biggest challenges to the highly militarized 
political and security order that Washington has worked for decades 
to consolidate in the Middle East are posed by, associated with, or 
potentially exploitable by the Islamic Republic of Iran. Hillary Mann 
Leverett and I have developed a particular take on the U.S.-Iranian 
competition for influence in the region, which we develop in our 
book, Going to Tehran: Why the United States Must Come to Terms with the 
Islamic Republic of Iran.6 Our take is captured in two related 
                                                 
6 FLYNT LEVERETT & HILLARY MANN LEVERETT, GOING TO TEHRAN: 
WHY THE UNITED STATES MUST COME TO TERMS WITH THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC 
OF IRAN (2013).  
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assessments: first, that the United States is, in relative terms, a 
declining power in the Middle East; and second, that the biggest 
beneficiary of America’s regional decline is the Islamic Republic of 
Iran.7 
Those unsure whether they agree with these assessments 
should compare the positions of the United States and the Islamic 
Republic in the Middle East on the eve of the 9/11 attacks, just over 
a decade ago, to their positions today. On the eve of 9/11, every 
Middle Eastern government was either reflexively pro-American (like 
Egypt and Turkey), in negotiation to become pro-American (like 
Qadhafi’s Libya and Bashar al-Assad’s Syria), or staunchly anti-
Iranian (like Saddam Husayn’s Iraq and Afghanistan under the 
Taliban). Today, because of elections, governments in Iraq, Lebanon, 
Libya, Palestine, Tunisia, and Turkey are no longer reflexively pro-
American or anti-Iranian. All are now pursuing more independent 
foreign policies—which means they are less enthusiastic about 
strategic cooperation with the United States and more open to the 
Islamic Republic. The same could have been said for post-Mubarak 
Egypt, too, at least until a July 2013 military coup deposed its first 
democratically elected (and Islamist) government. To the extent that 
any post-coup Egyptian government is interested in maintaining even 
a modicum of public support, it cannot afford to be seen as wholly 
subordinate to the United States (or Israel). This will surely correlate 
with the pursuit of at least some measure of foreign policy 
independence. In August 2013, for example, Egypt aligned with 
Algeria, Iraq, and Lebanon to block an Arab League consensus to 
endorse U.S. military action against Syria over the Assad 
government’s alleged use of chemical weapons. 
As a result of these developments, the United States is in a 
profoundly weaker position and the Islamic Republic is in a 
significantly stronger position in the Middle East today than they 
were on the eve of 9/11. Going to Tehran argues that this shift in the 
Middle East’s balance of power is happening both because of serious 
U.S. mistakes in the region and because of an Iranian national 
security strategy that has enabled Tehran to leverage U.S. mistakes to 
its very considerable advantage. 
                                                 
7 Id. at 1-11.  
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A. America’s Counterproductive Quest for Middle Eastern 
Hegemony 
When we refer to U.S. policy mistakes—including but by no 
means limited to the Iraq War—we do not identify them as 
idiosyncratic products of the George W. Bush administration. Rather, 
they stem from a much deeper source that cuts across Democratic 
and Republican administrations. We describe it as the United States 
giving in to a post-Cold War temptation to act as an imperial power 
in the Middle East. For the past twenty years, America has not been 
content to maintain its military primacy in the Middle East, defend its 
interests there, and legitimize its presence by soberly and effectively 
managing the regional balance of power. Instead, it has tried to 
remake the Middle East in accordance with American preferences, 
working to coerce political outcomes there with the aim of 
consolidating a highly militarized, pro-American regional order. 
The United States did this by retaining military forces on the 
ground in Saudi Arabia and other Arab states after the first Gulf War 
(something it did not do, to any significant degree, during the Cold 
War, and which led directly to the emergence of Al-Qa’ida and the 
9/11 attacks). It did this by leveling sanctions against Saddam 
Husayn’s regime that led to the deaths of more than a million Iraqis, 
half of them children; by invading Afghanistan and Iraq after 9/11 
and pursuing prolonged occupations in these countries that have 
killed hundreds of thousands of civilians; and by helping Israel 
consolidate a nearly absolute freedom of unilateral military initiative.8 
As it has pursued these policies, the United States has also worked to 
isolate the Islamic Republic of Iran diplomatically, to press it 
economically, and to foment its collapse.9 
Taken together, these policies constitute what Going to Tehran 
calls the imperial turn in U.S. Middle East policy. Pursued with little 
regard for on-the-ground realities, this imperial turn has proven not 
just quixotic but deeply damaging to American interests. Strategic 
failures in Afghanistan and Iraq have squandered human and material 
resources, while underscoring for the world, and especially for Middle 
                                                 
8 Leverett & Mann Leverett, supra note 2, at 216-20.  
9 LEVERETT & MANN LEVERETT, supra note 6, at 279-84, 328-54. 
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Eastern publics, the limits of what American military can 
accomplish.10 More fundamentally, the imperial thrust of American 
policy has decimated the perceived legitimacy of American purposes 
in the Middle East for the vast majority of the people living there. 
Twenty years ago, perhaps even ten years ago, that fact might not 
have seemed so significant. But today, when Middle Eastern publics 
are becoming more politically engaged and when their opinions are 
mattering more than ever before, this is strategically devastating for 
the United States. 
When he first ran for president in 2008, Barack Obama 
professed to understand this challenge; he pledged to change what he 
called the “mindset” that had gotten America into the strategic 
mistake of invading Iraq and, more broadly, to recast America’s 
Middle East policies. Instead, he has pursued the same sorts of 
policies—including on Iran—as his predecessors, policies that did 
significant damage to America’s strategic position. As a result, the 
Middle East’s balance of power has shifted even further away from 
the United States and its allies on Obama’s watch than at the end of 
George W. Bush’s presidency.11 
B. Iran’s Counter-Hegemonic Strategy. 
On the other side of the U.S.-Iranian divide, the Islamic 
Republic has developed a counter-hegemonic national security 
strategy. This strategy has enabled the Islamic Republic not only to 
survive, but also to carve out enough strategic autonomy over the 
past 34 years to attain a high degree of political consolidation and to 
achieve a wide range of impressive developmental outcomes. By 
building a domestic order and pursuing a foreign policy that attracts 
Middle Eastern populations, it has also been able to take advantage 
of American mistakes to improve its own position in the Middle 
East.12 
                                                 
10 This point is also made in Stephen M. Walt, The End of the American 
Era, NAT’L INTEREST, Oct. 25, 2011, at 10-11.  
11 See Leverett & Mann Leverett, supra note 2, at 222-23. On Iran more 
specifically, also see LEVERETT & MANN LEVERETT, supra note 6, at 354-67.  
12 While many Western commentators argue that the Islamic Republic’s 
internal politics and illegitimacy will undermine it and “solve” America’s Iran 
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Going to Tehran draws on years of discussions with Iranian 
diplomats, national security officials, and politicians to explain how 
the world looks, strategically, from their point of view. Looking at a 
map, one sees that Iran shares land, littoral, and maritime borders 
with fifteen states.13 Virtually all have been hostile to the idea of an 
Islamic Republic in Iran. Several have been more than just hostile: 
the Islamic Republic’s eastern neighbor—Afghanistan, under the 
Taliban—stormed the Iranian consulate in Mazar-e Sharif, killing 
Iranian diplomats. Its western neighbor—Iraq, under Saddam 
Husayn, with help from other Arab neighbors and America—invaded 
it, killing 300,000 Iranians. Today, many of those same Arab 
neighbors host thousands of U.S. troops and billions of dollars of the 
deadliest U.S. weapons systems, all poised to attack the Islamic 
Republic.14 
To deal with these challenges, the Islamic Republic has 
worked to develop conventional and asymmetric defensive 
capabilities, but it has virtually no capacity to project military power 
offensively beyond its borders.15 The real key to Iran’s foreign policy 
gains in the region has been what Going to Tehran calls its “soft 
power” strategy.16 One of the remarkable things about the shift in the 
Middle East’s balance of power over the last decade or so, away from 
the United States and its allies and toward Iran and its allies, is that 
this shift has virtually nothing to do with the Islamic Republic’s use 
of military force or economic coercion. The Islamic Republic has not 
                                                 
problem, the Islamic Republic is, in fact, supported by a sizable majority of Iranians 
living there and is not about to implode—a topic treated at greater length in this 
issue of the journal by Hillary Mann Leverett, How Precipitous a Decline? U.S.-Iranian 
Relations and the Transition from American Primacy, 2 PENN. ST. J. L. & INT’L AFF. 328 
(2013).   
13 They are Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Iraq, Kazakhstan, 
Kuwait, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, and 
the United Arab Emirates. 
14 See LEVERETT & MANN LEVERETT, supra note 6, at 45-59, for a 
discussion on Iranian threat perceptions.  
15 On the Islamic Republic’s military capabilities, see id. at ch. 2.  
16 Harvard’s Joseph Nye defines soft power as the ability to get others to 
“want what you want,” rather than coercing them to do what you want through 
hard military or economic power. See JOSEPH S. NYE, BOUND TO LEAD: THE 
FUTURE OF AMERICAN POWER 31 (1990). Also see LEVERETT & MANN 
LEVERETT, supra note 6, 90-101, for a discussion of Iran’s soft power strategy.  
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invaded any country or sanctioned any state; its rise is much more 
about the growth of its soft power. 
Recall my earlier point about the intensifying mobilization of 
Middle Eastern publics and the growing importance of those publics’ 
opinions and attitudes in determining on-the-ground political 
outcomes. The Middle East’s balance of power is progressively less 
defined by hard military capabilities, where the United States has clear 
advantages and the Islamic Republic is relatively deficient, and more 
and more defined in terms of who can appeal to regional publics, 
where the Islamic Republic has real advantages. In this context, Iran 
is pursuing a strategy that galvanizes regional publics’ grievances 
against the United States and Israel and against their own 
unrepresentative regimes that cooperate, in various ways, with the 
United States and Israel. The Islamic Republic, in effect, aligns itself 
with those publics, and with public opinion itself, to constrain hostile, 
unrepresentative, and pro-Western neighboring governments from 
working with the United States to attack it. Over the years, Tehran 
has reinforced these aspects of its soft power strategy by picking 
political winners as its allies in key regional arenas—e.g., Hizballah in 
Lebanon, Shi’a Islamist and Kurdish parties in Iraq, and HAMAS in 
Palestine.17 
Washington dismisses much of this as Iranian “support for 
terrorism.” But, with all due respect for the paramilitary capabilities 
of Iranian-supported groups resisting Israeli occupation, or resisting 
violent jihadi elements like Al-Qa’ida and the Taliban, the most 
interesting thing about these groups is that, when given the chance, 
they win elections. And they win for the right reasons—because they 
authentically represent unavoidable constituencies with real and 
legitimate grievances. When the United States refuses to deal with 
these groups by calling them terrorist organizations, it reduces even 
further its chances of constructively influencing regional 
developments, and opens up even more political space for Iran. 
The soft power logic of Iranian strategy applies even in the 
case of Syria and the ongoing conflict there. It has become 
conventional wisdom in Washington that whatever soft power gains 
                                                 
17 LEVERETT & MANN LEVERETT, supra note 6, at 64-78.  
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the Islamic Republic had accrued in the Middle East over the past 
decade or so have been squandered as a result of the support that 
Tehran and its Hizballah allies have extended to Syrian President 
Bashar al-Assad and his government. But Iran and Hizballah have a 
very different assessment. They evaluate the Syrian conflict as the 
product of a U.S.- and Saudi-instigated campaign for regime change 
in Damascus, motivated by American and Saudi interest in 
undermining the Islamic Republic’s security and weakening its 
regional position.18 Hizballah, for its part, identifies a “U.S.-Israeli-
takfeeri project” that has been unleashed in Syria, aimed at changing 
Syria’s strategic orientation in order to enfeeble Iran and Hizballah’s 
capacity to resist American and Israeli hegemonic aspirations in the 
region.19 Iranian and Hizballah officials recognize that backing the 
Assad government has cost the Islamic Republic and Hizballah some 
of the enormous standing that they have built up with Sunni Arab 
publics—especially as Saudi Arabia and others on the Arab side of 
the Persian Gulf work assiduously to cast the Syrian conflict in 
sectarian terms. But in their calculations, as regional appreciation 
grows that the Syrian conflict is, at its core, about resistance, the 
sectarian issue will fade.20 In the meantime, the Islamic Republic 
                                                 
18 See Kayhan Barzegar, Rouhani, Iran Key to Political Solution in Syria, AL-
MONITOR (June 17, 2013),  
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/06/iran-hassan-rouhani-
geneva-syria.html, for information about the Iranian policy toward Syria.   
19 Discussions with Hizballah representatives in Beirut, Lebanon. (June 
2013). See also Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah, Hizballah Secretary-General, Speech on 
Hizballah’s Resistance and Liberation Day (May 25, 2013) and Sayyid Hassan 
Nasrallah, Hizballah Secretary-General, Speech on Hizballah’s Injured Fighter Day 
(June 14, 2013), for discussions of the Syrian conflict. In a religious context, the 
Arabic word takfeer refers to the practice of declaring someone claiming to be 
Muslim as kāfir, pl, kuffār—an unbeliever masquerading as a pious person. It is a 
prominent aspect of the kind of salafi Islam championed by Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd 
al-Wahhab, the 18th century preacher whose religious ideas continue to ground the 
form of Islam officially promulgated by Saudi Arabia, both at home and abroad. 
Over the last thirty years, takfeeri ideology—which is, among other things, anti-Shi’a 
in orientation—has been a powerful motivator for Saudi-supported jihadi 
movements (e.g., Afghan mujahideen, parts of whom evolved into Al-Qa’ida and the 
Taliban, and, more recently, jihadi groups in Iraq, Libya, and Syria, some of which 
have publicly affiliated themselves with Al-Qa’ida).   
20 For further discussion, see Hal intahat julat Qusayr wa tudā’yāthā [Has the 
Qusayr round ended and what are its implications?] (Interview with Flynt Leverett), 
MIN AD-DAKHIL (Al-Mayadeen), July 7, 2013,  
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retains vastly higher favorability ratings with Arab and other regional 
publics than the United States.21 
C.  Understanding Iran’s Nuclear Program 
How does Iran’s nuclear program fit into its foreign policy 
and national security strategy? To answer this question, it is 
important to consider first what the program actually comprises. 
In terms of reactor infrastructure, Iran currently operates the 
Tehran Research Reactor (TRR)22 that, among other things, produces 
medical isotopes for cancer patients, under international safeguards.23 
Additionally, Iran now operates a Russian-built power reactor at 
Bushehr, on the Persian Gulf, also under safeguards, and is building a 
heavy water reactor at Arak. Besides reactors, Iran is developing 
indigenous fuel cycle capabilities. In its main enrichment plant at 
Esfahan and in a newer site at Fordo, Iran is enriching uranium, again 
                                                 
http://www.almayadeen.net/ar/Programs/Episode/dmqS2FYuUkeiDqH3AP3_4
w/2013-07-07-تهت-هل ة-ان ير-جول ص ق داعي-و-ال هات  It is also notable that, while .ات
HAMAS declined to fight for the Assad government after the Syrian conflict broke 
out and relocated its external political leadership from Damascus, it has not called 
for Assad’s removal. In discussions in Doha, Qatar in May 2013, senior HAMAS 
officials said that they continue to hold that a negotiated settlement between the 
Syrian government and the opposition is the only way to end the conflict—
essentially the same position taken by Iran and Hizballah.   
21 See Flynt Leverett & Hillary Mann Leverett, Iran and the United States—
What Really Matters to Middle Eastern Publics?, HUFFINGTON POST, Mar. 6, 2013, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/flynt-and-hillary-mann-leverett/iran-and-the-
united-state_b_2821860.html, for information on this point. See also SHIBLEY 
TELHAMI, THE WORLD THROUGH ARAB EYES: ARAB PUBLIC OPINION AND THE 
RESHAPING OF THE MIDDLE EAST 129-30, 134-35, 137-43 (2013).   
22 America originally gave the TRR to the Shah—who openly stated his 
intention to develop nuclear weapons—in the 1960s. Initially, the TRR ran on 
uranium fuel enriched to weapons-grade levels. After the Iranian Revolution, the 
Islamic Republic reconfigured it to run on fuel enriched to just below 20 percent, 
greatly reducing the proliferation risks of its operation.  LEVERETT & MANN 
LEVERETT, supra note 6, at 86-87. 
23 The TRR is located on the fringes of the University of Tehran campus 
in the middle of the city; one can see it from the conference room of the 
university’s Faculty of World Studies, where Hillary Mann Leverett and I have 
given guest seminars.   
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under safeguards, to the 3-4 percent level needed to fuel power 
reactors and to the near-20 percent level required by the TRR.24 
Since the early 1990s, American and Israeli intelligence 
services have warned that Iran is three to five years away from 
acquiring nuclear weapons. Yet twenty years into this constantly 
resetting forecast, no intelligence agency has come remotely close to 
producing hard evidence that Iran is trying to fabricate nuclear 
weapons. Even at the near-20 percent level, Iran is below both the 
International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) 20-percent threshold 
for highly enriched uranium and the 90-plus-percent level for bomb-
grade material. The IAEA has, for years, consistently affirmed that 
there has been no diversion of nuclear material from Iran’s nuclear 
facilities, and has never found evidence Iran is enriching anywhere 
close to weapons-grade levels. Indeed, American and Israeli 
intelligence services currently say that Iran is, at this point, not 
working to fabricate nuclear weapons.25 
Going to Tehran identifies two powerful reasons why the 
Islamic Republic is unlikely to build such weapons. First, there is 
strong consensus among Iranian political and policy elites that 
acquiring a relatively small nuclear arsenal would diminish, not 
enhance the Islamic Republic’s security.26 Second, beyond this 
strategic rationale, both Imam Khomeini, the Islamic Republic’s 
“founding father” and its first Supreme Leader, and Ayatollah 
Khamenei, the current Leader, have declared that nuclear weapons 
violate Islamic law, that they are haraam—forbidden by God. 
One may discount this as mere talk, but there is an important 
precedent where the Islamic Republic also walked the walk on this 
issue. During the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, Iran was subjected for 
years to chemical attack—against civilian as well as military targets—
while the United States (which was backing Saddam Husayn’s war of 
aggression against the fledgling Islamic Republic) blocked the United 
Nations Security Council from taking any action on the matter. As 
the attacks continued, Iranian military commanders asked for 
                                                 
24 LEVERETT & MANN LEVERETT, supra note 6, at 81-85.  
25 Id. at 85.  
26 Id. at 85-86.   
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Khomeini’s authorization to use the infrastructure inherited from the 
Shah to mass produce chemical weapons agents and fabricate 
chemical weapons, so as to be capable of retaliating in kind against 
Iraqi chemical attacks. Khomeini said no, holding that chemical 
weapons were haraam (forbidden by God) and that the Islamic 
Republic would not use them, even though it was being regularly 
subjected to chemical attack. 
Khomeini and Khamenei have both said that nuclear 
weapons, like chemical weapons, violate God’s law. In a system that 
legitimates itself in no small part on the basis of its perceived 
adherence to Islamic law, that is not a trivial thing.27 
So if the Iranian nuclear program is not a weapons program, 
what are its purposes? Three stand out. First, while a lot of Western 
commentary derides the suggestion that the program has an 
economic rationale, there are, in fact, real economic and 
technological benefits that Iran accrues from its nuclear activities. 
They allow Iranian scientists, engineers, and technicians to develop 
expertise (for example, in centrifuge technology) applicable beyond 
the nuclear arena and to establish new sectors (for example, 
producing medical isotopes) for the Iranian economy. Iran already 
exports electricity to Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, and Turkey, and 
wants to expand such exports in the future. Developing nuclear 
energy for the purpose of power generation directly supports this 
ambition. It also prospectively allows the Islamic Republic to devote 
more of its oil to export or to value-adding processes like oil-based 
petrochemicals. Likewise, nuclear energy frees up natural gas for 
injection into aging oil fields and for cultivating petrochemicals and 
other gas-based industries.28 
Second, from a security perspective, the way that the program 
has developed suggests that it is partly aimed at giving the Islamic 
Republic some measure of what is often called a nuclear option by 
allowing Iranian scientists and engineers to develop at least some of 
the core competencies for fabricating nuclear weapons, but without 
actually building them. Policy elites across the Iranian political 
                                                 
27 Id. at 87.  
28 Id. at 87-88.  
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spectrum acknowledge that perceptions the Islamic Republic is 
developing such a nuclear option have deterrent value even without 
overt weaponization. Furthermore, the nuclear program gives Tehran 
leverage to compel Washington to come to terms with it, making the 
nuclear issue an attractive point of entry for dealing with the United 
States and other major powers on larger strategic questions.29 
Third—and most importantly—the program’s main strategic 
purposes are political rather than military. The Islamic Republic is 
pursuing its nuclear rights in defiance of America and Israel—and 
that has powerful resonance not just at home but across the region. 
Some Arab leaders may not like the Iranian program, but polls of 
predominantly Sunni Arab populations show large majorities have 
been strongly supportive of Iran’s nuclear efforts. Some even show 
large majorities of Arabs thinking it would be a good thing if Iran 
acquired nuclear weapons.30 
And that brings us back to Iran’s soft power strategy. 
Through its narrative—not its drones or tanks or even its centrifuges, 
but its narrative—the Islamic Republic is using the political 
awakening of Middle Eastern publics to alter the very nature of 
power politics in the region. The Middle East’s balance of power is 
becoming, more and more, a balance of influence. The Islamic 
Republic is both encouraging and taking advantage of this transition 
to enhance its own regional standing. 
II.  ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL ORDER 
The resulting shift in the Middle East’s balance of power—
simultaneously distributional (affecting who has relative power) and 
essential (about the basis of power)—poses a high-stakes challenge 
for U.S. foreign policy. For its own interests, and on classic balance-
of-power grounds, America needs strategic rapprochement with the 
Islamic Republic. But Washington’s longstanding determination to 
suppress the emergence of independent power centers in the Middle 
East continues to warp U.S. policy choices toward the Islamic 
                                                 
29 Id. at 88, 90.  
30 Id. at 88-90. See also Leverett & Mann Leverett, supra note 21; 
TELHAMI, supra note 21, at 135-38. 
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Republic and the region more generally. It also warps the U.S. 
attitude toward global governance. 
U.S.-Iranian tensions over the Islamic Republic’s nuclear 
activities reflect two different ways of thinking about international 
order. One might be described as a positivistic, rules-focused 
approach. In this approach, substantive and procedural norms for 
international behavior are created by the consent of independent, 
sovereign states. Thus, international order is based very much on lex 
lata, what the law actually is, not lex ferenda, what the law (from one 
ideological view or another) should be. From a positivistic 
perspective, rules and norms, once created, are to be interpreted very 
narrowly, in terms of both how they are interpreted and who 
interprets them. 
The alternative is a more policy-oriented—one might say 
results-oriented—approach. From this perspective, what matters are 
the policy goals and values that motivate the creation of particular 
rules and norms—not the rules and norms themselves, but the goals 
and values underlying them. In further contrast to the positivistic 
approach, the policy-oriented approach ascribes a special role in 
interpreting rules and norms to the most powerful states in the 
system—those states with the resources and willingness to act in 
order to enforce the rules.31 
If one looks at who supports one of these approaches over 
the other, the positivistic approach is very much favored by non-
Western states. States in what we used to call the Third World have 
sharply criticized “colonial” international law for having warped the 
positivist principle of consent as the basis for international legal rules 
and obligations. But, with a universalized respect for national self-
determination, they have also embraced a positivist orientation to 
international law as an indispensable foundation for globalizing core 
legal principles of sovereign equality and non-interference in states’ 
                                                 
31 See the following sources for more on the contrasts between these 
approaches: ANTHONY CLARK AREND, LEGAL RULES AND INTERNATIONAL 
SOCIETY 67-86 (1999); Tai-Heng Cheng, Making International Law Without Agreeing 
What It Is, 10 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 1 (2011); and David Kleimann, 
Positivism, the New Haven School, and the Use of Force in International Law, 3 BSIS J. INT’L 
STUD. 26 (2006) (focusing on use of force questions).  
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internal affairs.32 From a non-Western perspective, it is only through 
this kind of positivism that international law, rules, and norms might 
actually constrain established powers as well as rising powers and the 
less powerful. 
Correspondingly, the policy-oriented approach tends to be 
favored by Western powers—above all, by the United States. Its 
modern intellectual roots go back to the 1950s and 1960s and the so-
called New Haven school of international law, forged by a network 
of scholars based largely at Yale Law School, the central figures in 
which were Myres McDougal and Harold Lasswell. Whatever their 
scholarly ambitions to reconstruct international legal methodology, 
the main policy-oriented goals of McDougal, Lasswell, and their 
protégés (as opposed to mere students, some of whom took very 
different policy positions) was to justify U.S. foreign policy in the 
Cold War context, especially regarding nuclear weapons, Third World 
intervention, and use-of-force questions.33 Another prominent Yale 
                                                 
32 See Agreement (with exchange of notes) on trade and intercourse 
between Tibet Region of China and India (April 29, 1954), 299 United Nations 
Treaty Series 57 (1958); Scott, supra note 5, at 2-3; S. PRAKASH SINHA, NEW 
NATIONS AND THE LAW OF NATIONS (1967); RAM PRAKASH ANAND, NEW STATES 
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1972); RAM PRAKASH ANAND, INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: CONFRONTATION OR COOPERATION (1987); 
Antony Anghie & B.S. Chimni, Third World Approaches to International Law and 
Individual Responsibility in Internal Conflicts, 2 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 77, 79-82 (2003); 
Dai Bingguo, Asia, China and International Law, 11 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 1 (2012); 
Christopher Clapham, Sovereignty and the Third World State, 47 POL. STUD. 522, 522-
29 (1999); James Thuo Gathii, International Law and Eurocentricity, 9 EUR. J. INT’L L. 
184 (1998); Karin Mickelson, Rhetoric and Rage: Third World Voices in International 
Legal Discourse, 16 WIS. INT’L L.J. 353 (1998); M. Sornarajah, Power and Justice: Third 
World Resistance in International Law, 10 SINGAPORE Y.B. INT’L L. 19 (2006); Ram 
Prakash Anand, Attitude of the Asian-African States toward Certain Problems of 
International Law, 15 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 55 (1966); S. Prakash Sinha, Perspective of the 
Newly Independent States on the Binding Quality of International Law, 14 INT’L & COMP. 
L.Q. 121 (1965); Steven Weber et al., A World Without the West, NAT’L INT., Summer 
2007, at 25-28; and Backgrounder: Five principles of peaceful coexistence, XINHUA, June 14, 
2004, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2005-04/08/content_2803638.htm. 
33 For representative presentations drawn from a sizable bibliography, see 
the following: Myres McDougal, Foreword to ROGER H. HULL & JOHN C. 
NOVOGROD, LAW AND VIETNAM at vii-ix (1968); Myres McDougal, Foreword to 
JOHN NORTON MOORE, LAW AND THE INDO-CHINA WAR at vii, xi (1972); Myres 
S. McDougal & Norbert A. Schlei, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests in Perspective: Lawful 
Measures for Security, 64 YALE L.J. 648 (1958), reprinted in MYRES MCDOUGAL ET AL., 
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law professor and dean, Eugene Rostow (who became a leading 
neoconservative foreign policy intellectual in the 1970s, 1980s, and 
1990s) also contributed to this agenda.34 In the post-9/11 period, the 
policy-oriented approach continues to have high-profile advocates in 
the legal academy, encompassing neoconservatives advocates of 
American unilateralism and preventive war on the right and liberal 
champions of humanitarian intervention and the “responsibility to 
protect” on the left.35 Certainly, over the last half century, its logic has 
                                                 
STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1960); Myres McDougal & Harold Lasswell, 
The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of Public Order, 53 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 
(1959), reprinted in MCDOUGAL ET AL., STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1960); 
and W. Michael Reisman, Deterrence and International Law, 4 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 339 (1983). For examples of contrary positions taken by international 
legal scholars trained at Yale during McDougal and Lasswell’s heyday, see the 
following: Richard Falk, Casting the Spell: The New Haven School of Law, 104 YALE L.J. 
1991 (1995) (reviewing HAROLD D. LASSWELL & MYRES S. MCDOUGAL, 
JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE SOCIETY: STUDIES IN LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 
(1992)); Richard Falk, Toward A Legal Regime For Nuclear Weapons, 28 MCGILL L.J. 
519 (1983); Richard Falk, Lee Meyrowitz, & Jack Sanderson, Nuclear Weapons and 
International Law, INDIAN J. INT’L L. 541 (1980); Richard A. Falk, International Law 
and the United States Role in the Vietnam War, 75 YALE L.J. 1122 (1966); Burns H. 
Weston, Nuclear Weapons and International Law: Prolegomenon to General Illegality, 4 
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 227 (1983); and Burns H. Weston, Nuclear Weapons 
Versus International Law: A Contextual Reassessment, 28 MCGILL L.J. 542 (1983).  
34 See, e.g., Eugene Rostow, Is There a Legal Basis for Nuclear Deterrence Theory 
and Policy?, in LAWYERS AND THE NUCLEAR DEBATE: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
CANADIAN CONFERENCE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND LAW 175 (1988); EUGENE  
ROSTOW, TOWARD MANAGED PEACE: THE NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS OF 
THE UNITED STATES, 1759 TO THE PRESENT (1995).    
35 On the neoconservative side, see, for example, Robert J. Delahunty & 
John Yoo, Great Power Security, 10 CHI. J. INT’L L. 35 (2009); Jack Goldsmith, Fire 
When Ready, FOR. POL’Y (March 19, 2012), 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/03/19/fire_when_ready; Eric 
Posner, Think Again: International Law, FOR. POL’Y (Sept. 17, 2009), 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/09/17/think_again_international_la
w; and John Yoo, Using Force, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 729 (2004). On the liberal side, 
see, for example, Allen Buchanan & Robert Keohane, The Preventive Use of Force: A 
Cosmopolitan Institutional Proposal, 18 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 1 (2004); Lee Feinstein & 
Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Duty to Prevent, FOR. AFF., Jan.-Feb. 2004; Anne-Marie 
Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power in a Networked World Order, 40 STAN. J. INT’L L. 283 
(2004); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Security, Solidarity, and Sovereignty: The Grand Themes of 
UN Reform, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 619 (2005); Thomas Weiss, R2P After 9/11 and the 
World Summit, 24 WIS. INT’L L.J. 741 (2006); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Was the Libyan 
Intervention Really an Intervention?, ATLANTIC, Aug. 26, 2011, 
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been strongly reflected in the perspectives that U.S. administrations, 
Democratic and Republican, have brought to bear in legal analyses of 
foreign policy questions. 
III.  THE IRANIAN CASE AND THE NUCLEAR  
NONPROLIFERATION REGIME 
Tensions between these divergent conceptions of world order 
condition U.S.-Iranian disagreements over the status of the Islamic 
Republic’s nuclear activities under the international nuclear 
nonproliferation regime, which rests on the foundation of the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The NPT, which opened 
for signature in 1968 and entered into force in 1970, is the 
international community’s main vehicle for regulating nuclear energy-
related technologies in both civil and military applications,36 It is 
appropriately understood as a set of three interrelated commitments 
by parties, which are divided into two categories, nuclear-weapon 
states [hereinafter “weapons states”] and non-nuclear-weapon states 
[hereinafter “non-weapons states”]. 
 In Article II and Article III, non-weapons states—like 
Iran—commit not to build or acquire nuclear weapons. 
 In Article VI, weapons states—the United States, Russia, 
Britain, France, and China—commit to good faith 
negotiations for nuclear disarmament. 
 In Article IV and Article V, all agree that parties have an 
“inalienable right” to use nuclear technology for peaceful 
purposes “without discrimination”—and are obligated to 
                                                 
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/08/was-the-libyan-
intervention-really-an-intervention/244175/; Anne-Marie Slaughter, Intervention, 
Libya, and the Future of Sovereignty, ATLANTIC, Sept. 4, 2011, 
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/09/intervention-libya-
and-the-future-of-sovereignty/244537/; and Ivo Daalder & James Steinberg, 
Preventive war, A useful tool, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2005, at M3, 
http://articles.latimes.com/2005/dec/04/opinion/op-preemptivewar4. 
36 JOYNER, supra note 2, at 3, 20. 
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facilitate the exercise of that right, especially by non-
weapon states.37 
There have long been strains between weapons states and 
non-weapons states over weapons states’ poor compliance with their 
commitment to disarm. Today, though, these tensions are particularly 
acute over perceived tensions between NPT signatories’ commitment 
to nonproliferation and their commitment to enabling the peaceful 
use of nuclear technology. 
A.  Reading (and Misreading) the NPT 
The two alternative conceptions of international order 
outlined above give rise to very different perspectives on interpreting 
the NPT regarding this issue. One perspective—grounded in the 
positivistic model of international law and global governance—gives 
the Treaty’s three core bargains equal standing. The other—grounded 
in the policy-oriented model—holds that non-weapons states’ 
commitment to nonproliferation trumps those by weapons states to 
nuclear disarmament and by all to the peaceful use of nuclear 
technology. Conflict between these perspectives is especially sharp 
over fuel cycle technology, the ultimate “dual use” capability (for the 
same material that fuels power and research reactors can, at higher 
levels of fissile isotope concentration, be used in nuclear bombs). 
For those holding that the NPT’s three core bargains have 
equal standing, the right of non-weapons states to safeguarded 
enrichment is clear—from the Treaty itself, from its negotiating 
history, and from subsequent practice, with at least a dozen non-
weapons states building fuel-cycle infrastructures potentially capable 
of supporting weapons programs. From a positivistic perspective, the 
denial of that right by a handful of powerful states amounts to an 
effort to rewrite the NPT unilaterally. Not surprisingly, the camp 
espousing this position includes the non-Western world, virtually in 
its entirety. By contrast, those claiming that nonproliferation trumps 
the NPT’s two other core bargains claim that there is no treaty-based 
                                                 
37 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for 
signature July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161, 
http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/NPT.shtml.  
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“right” to enrich. From a policy-oriented perspective, the manner in 
which non-weapons states pursue the peaceful use of nuclear 
technology must necessarily be subordinated to the NPT’s overriding 
goal of stopping the spread of nuclear weapons. This position is 
advocated primarily by Western powers, including the United States. 
Strikingly, Washington once held that the right to peaceful 
use includes the indigenous development of safeguarded fuel cycle 
capabilities. In 1968, as America and the Soviet Union, the NPT’s 
sponsors, prepared to open it for signature, U.S. officials told 
Congress that the Treaty permitted non-weapons states to pursue the 
fuel cycle.38 Since the Cold War’s end, though, the United States—
along with Britain, France, and Israel—has been determined to 
constrain the diffusion of fuel cycle capabilities to non-Western 
states. Their main motive has been to maximize America’s freedom 
of unilateral military initiative and, in the Middle East, that of Israel. 
Thus, the United States has come to hold that there is no 
treaty-based right for non-weapons states to pursue fuel cycle 
capabilities, and that weapons states and their allies with nuclear 
industries are entitled to decide which non-weapons states can 
possess fuel cycle technologies. From these premises, in the early 
2000s the Bush administration sought a worldwide ban on 
transferring fuel cycle technologies to countries not already 
possessing them.39 The Obama administration then pushed the 
Nuclear Suppliers’ Group to make such transfers conditional on 
recipients’ acceptance of the Additional Protocol to the NPT—an 
instrument devised at U.S. instigation in the 1990s to enable more 
intrusive and proactive inspections in non-weapons states.40 
Non-Western states see these efforts to constrain the 
diffusion of fuel cycle capabilities as a far greater threat to the NPT’s 
integrity than Iran’s nuclear activities. Among rising powers, Brazil 
and South Africa—both nonproliferation exemplars for joining the 
NPT as non-weapons states after forsaking weapons programs 
                                                 
38 Daniel Joyner, The Security Council as Legal Hegemon, 43 GEO. J. INT’L L. 
225, 243 (2012). 
39 JOYNER, supra note 2, at 47-51, 55-60, 78-87.   
40 Id at 110-12. 
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during democratization (including, in South Africa’s case, dismantling 
six fully fabricated nuclear bombs that Israel helped the apartheid 
regime to assemble)—have been especially resolute in defending non-
weapons states’ right to the fuel cycle. With Argentina, they resisted 
U.S. efforts to make transfers of fuel cycle technology contingent on 
non-weapons states’ acceptance of the Additional Protocol (which 
Brazil has refused to sign), ultimately forcing Washington to 
compromise.41 
B.  The NPT and Iranian Enrichment 
Currently, the conflict over how to read the NPT with 
respect to non-weapons states’ fuel cycle activities is engaged most 
prominently over whether Iran, as a non-weapons party to the 
Treaty, has a right to enrich uranium under international safeguards. 
Disagreements over the issue are effectively blocking efforts to 
resolve the controversy over the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program 
through diplomacy. 
In the Iranian case, just four countries—the United States, 
Britain, France, and Israel (which is not a signatory to the NPT)—
have led the charge to deny the Islamic Republic’s right to enrich. In 
these countries’ official view, Iran has forfeited whatever “right” to 
enrich that its representatives might assert because of problems in its 
compliance with its IAEA safeguards agreement that cast doubt on 
the peaceful nature of its nuclear program. Western and Israeli 
intelligence services also claim that the Islamic Republic has done at 
least theoretical work on aspects of nuclear weapons design and 
fabrication, thereby raising further serious questions about the 
peaceful nature of its program. Since 2006, moreover, the United 
Nations Security Council has adopted seven resolutions calling on 
Iran to suspend its fuel cycle activities.42 The Islamic Republic has yet 
                                                 
41 David Jonas, John Carlson, Richard Goorevich, The NSG Decision on 
Sensitive Nuclear Transfers: ABACC and the Additional Protocol, ARMS CONTROL 
ASSOCIATION (Nov. 2012), http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2012_11/The-NSG-
Decision-on-Sensitive-Nuclear-Transfers-ABACC-and-the-Additional-Protocol.  
42 S.C. Res. 1696, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1696 (July 31, 2006); S.C. Res. 1737, 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/ 1737 (Dec. 23, 2006); S.C. Res. 1747, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1747 
(Mar. 24, 2007); S.C. Res. 1803, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1803 (Mar. 3, 2008); S.C. Res. 
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to comply with these resolutions, prompting Western criticism of its 
failure to meet its “international obligations.” For America and its 
British, French, and Israeli partners, any diplomatic solution to the 
Iranian nuclear issue will require Iran to terminate its fuel cycle 
activities—or, at least, to stop them on an open-ended and long-term 
basis (at least a decade, if not longer).43 
In contrast, the “BRICS” (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South 
Africa) and the Non-Aligned Movement (with 120 countries 
representing nearly two-thirds of U.N. members) have unequivocally 
recognized Iran’s right—as well as that of other non-weapons 
states—to develop safeguarded indigenous fuel cycle capabilities.44 
Their position strongly reflects both a positivistic conception of 
international order and an interpretation of the NPT ascribing equal 
standing to its three core bargains. 
From a positivistic point of view, none of the claims by 
Western intelligence agencies about Iranian research on nuclear 
weapons design and fabrication has been substantiated by hard 
evidence, and none contradicts the IAEA’s continuing affirmation of 
Iran’s non-diversion of nuclear material. Through a positivistic prism, 
moreover, one cannot legitimately hold that the NPT prohibits the 
Islamic Republic from seeking the same standing, in terms of its 
nuclear infrastructure and capabilities, as Japan, Canada, and others 
                                                 
S/RES/1887 (Sept. 24, 2009); and S.C. Res. 1929, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1929 (June 9, 
2010).  
43 Discussions with American, British, and French officials. Western 
powers demand that Iran promptly stop enriching at the near-20 percent level; it 
must then comply with Security Council calls to cease all enrichment. U.S. officials 
say that Iran might be “allowed” a circumscribed enrichment program, after 
suspending for a decade or more; on this point, see also Robert Einhorn, Getting to 
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London and Paris insist that “zero enrichment” is the only acceptable long-term 
outcome. 
44 See BRICS Summit draws clear red lines on Syria, Iran, BRICS POST (Apr. 3, 
2013), http://thebricspost.com/brics-summit-draws-clear-red-lines-on-syria-
iran/#.Uewc_UrD-AI; Jason Ditz, Non-Aligned Movement Unanimously Backs Iran’s 
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that joined the Treaty as non-weapons states but are widely seen as 
able to produce nuclear weapons in relatively short order, should they 
choose to do so. Mohamed ElBaradei, the Nobel laureate under 
whose leadership the IAEA correctly assessed Iraq’s lack of weapons 
of mass destruction (WMD) when every Western intelligence agency 
got it wrong, has said that developing nuclear weapons capability—
not weapons, but competencies needed to make them—is “kosher” 
under the NPT.45 
For many positivistically-inclined analysts, the Security 
Council resolutions calling on the Islamic Republic to suspend 
enrichment violate Iran’s rights as both a sovereign state and as a 
party to the NPT. By extension, they also violate United Nations 
Charter provisions directing that the Security Council act “in 
accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations” 
and “with the present charter” and are, thus, invalid.46 Additionally, 
the first of these resolutions, from 2006—on which all of the 
subsequent resolutions are based—reflects an assessment of Tehran’s 
intent to build nuclear weapons that America’s own intelligence 
community repudiated in 2007. This repudiation arguably nullifies the 
legal basis for all seven resolutions calling on Iran to suspend 
enrichment.47 
For non-Western states and others holding that the NPT’s 
three core bargains have equal standing, the outlines of a diplomatic 
solution to the Iranian nuclear issue are as clear as Iran’s right to 
enrich: recognition of Iran’s nuclear rights in exchange for greater 
transparency in its nuclear activities. Working with Turkey, Brazil 
brokered the Tehran Declaration in May 2010, in which Iran 
accepted U.S. terms to swap most of its then stockpile of enriched 
                                                 
45 See Mohamed ElBaradei, A New Global Security System Towards a 
World Free From Nuclear Weapons  at John F. Kennedy School of Government, 
Harvard University (Apr. 26, 2010), http://forum.iop.harvard.edu/content/new-
global-security-system-towards-world-free-nuclear-weapons-conversation-
mohamed-el.  
46 For a brilliant exposition of this argument, see Joyner, supra note 38.   
47 Flynt Leverett & Hillary Mann Leverett, America’s Iran Policy and the 
Undermining of International Order, WORLD FIN. REV., July-August 2013, at 40, 
http://law.psu.edu/_file/TWFR%20Jul-Aug%202013America%20Iran-v2.pdf.  
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uranium for fuel for its research reactor.48 The Declaration, though, 
also recognized Iran’s right to enrich; for this reason, the Obama 
administration rejected it.49 Through the Non-Aligned Movement 
and other fora, non-Western states regularly reiterate their view that a 
negotiated settlement of the Iranian nuclear issue will require 
Western acknowledgment of the Islamic Republic’s nuclear rights. 
From this premise, Security Council resolutions requiring Iran to 
suspend impede, rather than encourage, productive diplomacy.50 
Even Russia and China, the Security Council’s two non-Western 
members, who acquiesced in all seven resolutions telling Tehran to 
suspend, note regularly that there will be no diplomatic solution 
absent Western recognition of Iran’s nuclear rights.51 
The basic idea of recognizing Iran’s nuclear rights, as a 
sovereign state and as a signatory to the NPT (including the right to 
enrich uranium under international safeguards), in exchange for 
greater transparency surrounding Iran’s nuclear activities, has long 
been the core of the Islamic Republic’s approach to nuclear 
diplomacy with the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the U.N. 
Security Council plus Germany). Since Hassan Rohani’s election as 
Iran’s president in 2013, the Islamic Republic’s new foreign minister, 
Javad Zarif, has advanced a substantive proposal to the P5+1 for 
resolving the nuclear issue on this basis, within a finite period. But 
the Obama administration and its British and French partners 
continue to insist, effectively, that “transparency is not enough”—
                                                 
48 See Text of the Iran-Brazil-Turkey deal, Julian Borger’s Global Security Blog, 
GUARDIAN, May 17, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/julian-borger-
global-security-blog/2010/may/17/iran-brazil-turkey-nuclear.   
49 See Flynt Leverett & Hillary Mann Leverett, Flynt Leverett Debates 
Obama’s Iran Policy with Dennis Ross, RACE FOR IRAN (Jan. 12, 2012), 
http://www.raceforiran.com/flynt-leverett-debates-obama%E2%80%99s-iran-
policy-with-dennis-ross.   
50 On the unhelpful impact of the Security Council resolutions on nuclear 
diplomacy with Tehran, see, for example, Reza Nasri, To Nudge Iran Talks, New 
Resolution Needed, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Apr. 25, 2013), 
http://www.csmonitor.com/layout/set/print/Commentary/Opinion/2013/0425/
To-nudge-Iran-talks-new-UN-resolution-needed.  
51 Conversations with Russian and Chinese officials suggest that Moscow 
and Beijing acquiesced to these resolutions partly to keep the United States in the 
Security Council on the Iranian nuclear issue, where they can exert ongoing 
influence—and restraint—over Washington. 
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that, if Iranian enrichment can be tolerated at all (and it remains 
unclear that Washington, London, and Paris are prepared to tolerate 
it), the Western powers must become, in essence, co-managers of the 
Iranian nuclear program, determining which Iranian nuclear facilities 
must be closed and which might be allowed to remain open, 
determining not how many additional centrifuges Iran might be 
allowed to install in the future but how many centrifuges it must 
dismantle to satisfy the United States (and Israel). 
How these differences over Iran’s nuclear activities are 
handled will profoundly affect the future of the nuclear 
nonproliferation regime. In his contribution to this symposium, 
Daniel Joyner rigorously scrutinizes the NPT and the various legal 
sources for the IAEA’s dealings with Iran; from this analysis, he 
comes down on the side of an essentially positivistic reading of the 
Iranian nuclear case.52 Just as importantly, he and Richard Butler both 
warn that warped interpretations of the NPT, distorted readings of 
the IAEA’s legal sources, and biased application of the law by 
America and its European hangers-on will further undermine the 
functioning of the current nonproliferation regime, the credibility and 
legitimacy of which are already eroding for ever larger parts of the 
international community.53 
IV.  THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR CASE AND USE OF FORCE DOCTRINE 
Tensions between the two divergent conceptions of 
international order described above are also reflected in debates over 
the proper interpretation of use of force doctrine54 and its application 
to the Iranian nuclear case. To put the question in its simplest form, 
if some states judge, based on their particular (and almost certainly 
policy-oriented) readings of the NPT, that the Islamic Republic is in 
violation of its Treaty obligations, can they find legal justification for 
a preventive attack against it? 
                                                 
52 Joyner, supra note 2. 
53 Butler, supra note 2.  
54 See Sean D. Murphy, The Doctrine of Preemptive Self-Defense, 50 VILL. L. 
REV. 699 (2005) (outlining four schools of thought, two of which, labeled “strict 
constructionist” and “imminent threat,” fall into what is described here as the 
positivist camp, and two of which, labeled “qualitative threat” and “charter-is-
dead,” fall into the policy-oriented camp).  
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The perceived risk of a U.S. or Israeli attack on Iranian 
nuclear facilities (and, in the U.S. case, perhaps other targets) waxes 
and wanes. With Rohani’s election, the resumption of nuclear talks 
between the P5+1 and Iran, and the Obama administration’s failed 
plan to strike Syria, the likelihood of military action seems, at least for 
now, to have declined. But, if the United States and its British and 
French partners are not prepared to adopt a more positivistic reading 
of the NPT and to deal with the Iranian nuclear issue on such a basis, 
then the current diplomatic effort between Iran and the P5+1 will 
fail. And if diplomacy fails, the perceived risk of a U.S. or Israeli 
strike on the Islamic Republic’s nuclear infrastructure will rise once 
again, particularly as that infrastructure continues to develop and 
expand. What does international law have to say about this?  
Under a positivistic reading of international law, there are two 
circumstances under which a state may legitimately use force. One is 
when the United Nations Security Council has adopted a resolution 
under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter authorizing the use 
of force in response to a specified threat to international peace and 
security. The other is under a narrow reading of the right of 
individual or collective self-defense as defined in Article 51 of the 
Charter. This requires evidence of either an actual armed attack or a 
threat of attack so imminent that a forceful response to it satisfies a 
strict construal of the legal principle of necessity and can be carried 
out in compliance with the legal principle of proportionality.55 In the 
absence of a Chapter VII resolution from the Security Council or a 
case meeting such a rigorous definition of self-defense, a state does 
not have the right to use force. 
It is highly unlikely that there will be a Security Council 
resolution authorizing the use of force against Iran over its nuclear 
activities, which eliminates one of the two potential legal justifications 
for attacking Iranian nuclear targets. In the Iranian case, Russia and 
China have learned from what they consider the bitter experience of 
the Council’s engagement on WMD issues prior to the 2003 invasion 
of Iraq, when Western powers justified the invasion in part by 
arguing that resolutions adopted more than a decade earlier in 
                                                 
55 See id. (expanding on the “strict constructionist” and “imminent threat’ 
schools); Kleimann, supra note 30; Mary Ellen O’Connell, supra note 2.  
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connection with the first Persian Gulf war also authorized the use of 
force against Iraq in 2003.56 As a result, Moscow and Beijing have 
made sure that Security Council resolutions dealing with the Iranian 
nuclear issue state explicitly that nothing in them can be construed as 
authorizing the use of force, and that such authorization would 
require separate action by the Council. 
But the lack of Security Council authorization does not 
definitively constrain policy-oriented analysts and American officials, 
who tend to downplay the centrality of the Council for contemporary 
decision-making about the use of force.57 Some argue that the threat 
of “WMD-seeking rogue states” has attenuated traditional readings of 
the United Nations Charter on the Council’s role in addressing 
threats to international peace and security.58 Others, like 
neoconservative John Yoo, go so far as to argue that the United 
States is entitled simply to ignore the Council on the grounds that it 
“lacks political legitimacy” and “is contrary to both American 
national interests and global welfare because it subjects any 
intervention, no matter how justified or beneficial, to the approval of 
authoritarian nations.”59 
With the Security Council deemed irrelevant, the policy-
oriented case for launching a war against the Islamic Republic over its 
nuclear activities relies on the notion of preventive self-defense.60 
Consider, in this regard, Matthew Kroenig’s widely noted brief for 
U.S. strikes on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. Kroenig begins his brief 
by asserting “the true danger that a nuclear-armed Iran would pose to 
U.S. interests in the Middle East and beyond” is so great as to 
                                                 
56 This point was especially salient in the arguments that the British and 
Australian governments offered; while some American officials, most notably 
Secretary of State Colin Powell, suggested that the United States shared the official 
British and Australian view, this argument was not a major part of the Bush 
administration’s formal case for war. See Alex Bellamy, International Law and the War 
With Iraq, 4 MELB. J. INT’L L. 497 (2003), for further discussion on this topic.  
57 Murphy, supra note 52, (discussing the “charter-is-dead” school).  
58 Matthew Waxman, The Use of Force Against States that Might Have 
Weapons of Mass Destruction, 31 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1 (2009).  
59 John Yoo, An Unavoidable Challenge, NAT’L REV. (Dec. 31, 2011), 
http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/286953/unavoidable-challenge-john-yoo.  
60 This was also a major part of the Bush administration’s case for 
invading Iraq in 2003. See Bellamy, supra note 54.  
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require, at least for Kroenig and other like-minded analysts, a 
heightened, post-9/11 formulation of imminent threat. As for 
proportionality, Kroenig posits that “a military strike intended to 
destroy Iran’s nuclear program, if managed carefully, could spare the 
region and the world a very real threat and dramatically improve the 
long-term national security of the United States.”61 
For this to work, though, the definition of “U.S. interests in 
the Middle East and beyond” and “the long-term national security of 
the United States” must be stretched to encompass not just physical 
security but what might more accurately be described as hegemonic 
preference. Consider what Kroenig himself writes regarding the real 
motive for a prospective U.S. attack on Iran: “a nuclear armed Iran 
would immediately limit U.S. freedom of action in the Middle 
East.”62 The reasoning underlying John Yoo’s advocacy of a 
preventive U.S. attack on Iran is even more expansively hegemonic: 
The United States has assumed the role, once held by 
Great Britain, of guaranteeing free trade and 
economic development, spreading liberal values, and 
maintaining international security. An attack on 
Iranian nuclear facilities, though it would impose 
costs in human lives and political turmoil, would 
serve these interests and forestall the spread of 
conflict and terror.63  
From a positivistic perspective, this amounts to a reading of 
the right of self-defense so tortured that virtually no other state 
besides the United States (or Israel) would accept it as justification 
for a preventive attack against the Islamic Republic. But this is 
precisely the argument that will be deployed, if and when the time 
comes, to validate U.S. strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities. U.S. 
government lawyers are already drafting their briefs, should President 
Obama decide in the next three years that the development of the 
                                                 
61 Matthew Kroenig, Time to Attack Iran: Why a Strike Is the Least Bad 
Option, FOR. AFF., Jan-Feb. 2012, at 77, 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136917/matthew-kroenig/time-to-attack-
iran.  
62 Id. at 78.  
63 Yoo, supra note 57.  
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Islamic Republic’s fuel cycle capabilities has gone too far for his 
strategic or political comfort. 
How the debate over the prospective use of force by the 
United States against Iran’s nuclear infrastructure plays out will have 
hugely important implications for the future of world order. In her 
contribution to this symposium, Mary Ellen O’Connell presents a 
rich exposition and defense of the U.N. Charter regime regarding the 
use of force, along with an essentially positivistic application of this 
regime and other relevant law to the prospective use of force against 
Iranian nuclear targets. This leads her to a firm rejection of the 
unilateral resort, by the United States or others, to armed coercion 
against the Islamic Republic.64 James Houck, in his contribution, 
evinces sympathy for arguments that a strict reading of the U.N. 
Charter regime is not universally helpful to real-world decision-
makers in an era of WMD and demonstrated threats of terrorism. 
Nevertheless, he also notes that, at this point, he has seen no 
evidence or argument to date in the public domain leading him to 
judge that a predicate currently exists for an armed attack on Iran.65 
How this debate plays out will also have enormous 
implications for America’s position in the international community. 
As Americans engage in the debate, they would do well to consider 
James Houck’s observation that there is much in public discussions 
of these issues in the United States that is undermining and 
disrespectful of international law.66 Such a trend, if perpetuated, will 
prove corrosive not only of the prospects for genuinely rules-based 
international order in the 21st century, but also of America’s standing 
and role in world affairs.67 
Restoring America’s international standing and influence—
and boosting the prospects for rules-based international order in the 
21st century—will require very substantial strategic revision by the 
United States. Consider, once again, the Obama administration’s 
                                                 
64 O’Connell, supra note 53.  
65 See Presentation of James Houck at Symposium, video available at 
http://elibrary.law.psu.edu/jlia.  
66 Id.  
67 This is explored more deeply in Mann Leverett, supra note 12.  
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publicly announced plan to use force—without any legal justification 
under the U.N. Charter—in Syria. After August 21, 2013, much of 
America’s political class was initially still inclined to support President 
Obama’s call for military action. Much of the mainstream media 
comported themselves with the same lack of journalistic rigor that so 
many media outlets displayed in evaluating the Bush administration’s 
case for illegally invading and occupying Iraq in 2003. But, in 2013, 
the American public rejected a sitting president’s case for imperial 
war—and rejected it overwhelmingly, to a point where even many 
congressmen and senators who would otherwise have backed 
Obama’s initiative concluded that, this time, they could not do so. It 
is not yet possible to know if Americans’ rejection of Obama’s call 
for illegal and strategically dysfunctional U.S. military action against 
Syria represents the beginning of a true sea change in popular 
attitudes about American foreign policy. Perhaps it was simply the 
product of a contingent concatenation of circumstances—post-
Iraq/(not quite) post-Afghanistan/post-Libya “war weariness,” 
frustration with a slow economic recovery and an uncertain long-
term economic future, etc. But perhaps Americans are at least at the 
start of a true learning curve. Only time will tell. 
 
 
